The writer was vice-president Kamala Harris’s national security adviser. Daleep Singh, deputy national security adviser for international economics in the Biden administration, also contributed
Europe’s response to the Trump administration’s shocking withdrawal of support for Ukraine has been admirable and may prove historic. Instead of accepting Donald Trump’s embrace of Russia’s false narrative about the war, remaining silent, or quarrelling among themselves, European leaders have doubled down on support for Kyiv, pledging to boost security assistance and assemble a “coalition of the willing”.
These steps are welcome, but not sufficient. Increases in European defence spending will not come quickly enough to replace the equipment Washington has been transferring to Ukraine. And without an American backstop, which Trump refuses to provide, even European forces in Ukraine would not be an adequate deterrent against future Russian aggression.
Instead, the only truly effective option to save Ukraine is to seize the over $200bn in Russian assets currently frozen in Europe and to commit that money to supporting Ukraine’s economy, military, and defence industrial base. That money would help Ukraine acquire the means to defend itself and provide a lifeline for its economy. And it would give Europe the negotiating leverage it needs to broker a just and lasting end to the war.
French officials are reported to be considering a plan to seize the Russian assets if Moscow violates a future ceasefire deal. But that idea overlooks the reality that any ceasefire worth the paper it is written on will require Ukraine to develop a force capable of deterring future Russian aggression and a path to rebuilding an economy devastated by three years of Russian attacks. Neither of these things will be possible without using some of the frozen assets, especially as Washington cuts off financial support for Ukraine.
In the Biden administration, we worked for years to persuade Europe to join us in transferring those assets to Ukraine, but were unsuccessful. While Europeans went along with a G7 agreement in the autumn to provide a loan to Ukraine guaranteed by interest on the frozen assets, they continued to come up with reasons not to seize the principal. But their arguments were not persuasive then and are far less persuasive now. As European leaders reconsider their options, they should keep several points in mind.
First, while the legal basis for forfeiture is disputed, many legal scholars have concluded it is sound so long as it is done in the context of countermeasures against Russia’s unlawful aggression. The long-established principle of “set off” would allow Ukraine to net its claim for reparation damages against Russia’s claim to retrieve its frozen assets.
Second, seizing the Russian assets in Europe will not, contrary to European concerns, deter countries from holding euros any more than freezing these assets indefinitely, which Europe and G7 countries are already doing. US, European, UK, and Japanese action to immobilise Russia’s assets in 2022 has hardly deterred anyone from holding dollars, euros, sterling or yen since then, even though almost no one believes Russia will ever get those assets back.
Third, just because most of the frozen assets are in Europe does not mean that the euro would be at more risk than the dollar. It’s no secret that US authorities led the way in persuading the G7 to freeze Russia’s assets in the immediate aftermath of Putin’s invasion. Last spring, Congress voted overwhelmingly to give the president authority to seize these assets for the benefit of Ukraine. Today, no potential aggressor nations would conclude their assets are safer in the US than in Europe.
Fourth, the risk of opening a Pandora’s box for second world war reparations is overblown. While some in Poland would use seizure to bolster their long-standing claims, there is no appetite elsewhere for reopening that settled issue.
And finally, while Russia has threatened to retaliate against foreign companies operating there if Europe transfers its frozen assets to Ukraine, the incremental risk is minimal. Any western business that still has physical or intangible assets inside Russia has either written off those claims or already understands they will need to do so.
None of this is to dismiss European concerns about seizing Russia’s assets as trivial. But with US support for Ukraine now in serious doubt, the greater danger is continued inaction. Decisive European steps to seize Russia’s assets would shake up the balance of power in the conflict as much as Trump’s pivot to Russia last week did — but this time in the name of justice and freedom rather than the shameful betrayal of a democratic ally fighting for its existence.
