Donald Trump will never win the Nobel Peace prize. But he should be a strong contender for the Charlemagne prize — which is awarded each year to the person who has made the greatest contribution to European unity.
The US president has courted Russia, undermined faith in the Nato alliance, threatened the EU with tariffs and boosted the far right in Europe. All this has had a galvanising effect on the EU. Fundamental steps towards greater European unity — stalled for decades — are now under way.
There are three key areas to watch. The first is European defence; the second is joint European debt; the third is repairing the breach between the UK and the EU.
Dramatic swings in European public opinion underpin these developments. A poll last week showed that 78 per cent of British people regard Trump as a threat to the UK. Some 74 per cent of Germans and 69 per cent of the French agree. In another poll, France was rated as a “reliable partner” by 85 per cent of Germans and Britain scored 78 per cent — the US is down at 16 per cent.
Many European leaders agree that Trump’s America is now a threat, though few will say it out loud for diplomatic reasons. They are also uncomfortably aware of how the transatlantic alliance, now in its eighth decade, has made them highly dependent on American military support. This is not just a question of money. The really dangerous dependencies are on US technology and weaponry.
The Europeans can see how much trouble the Ukrainians are in after the Trump administration’s decision to cut off flows of intelligence and weaponry. So they are pursuing a two-track policy. They need to delay the severance of American military support to Europe for as long as possible, while preparing for that moment as fast as possible.
That was the logic behind last week’s decision to allow the European Commission to raise €150bn to spend on the EU defence industry. The new spending is likely to be concentrated on areas where European countries are particularly dependent on America, such as air defence.
The issuance of common European debt is not just a way of raising money for defence. It also offers the chance to build up the euro as an alternative to the dollar as a global reserve currency. The capriciousness of the Trump administration means that there is a considerable global appetite for an alternative to US Treasuries as a safe asset.
The taboo against common European debt is traditionally strong in frugal Germany. It was partially broken during the pandemic. Now it is likely to be swept away. Friedrich Merz, who will be Germany’s next chancellor, is also moving to exempt national spending on defence and infrastructure from his country’s constitutional limits on deficit spending. Its past fiscal prudence means that Germany has much more space to borrow than heavily indebted France or Britain.
A form of military Keynesianism could restimulate Europe’s largest economy. As one leading French businessman put it to me, with more than a touch of ambivalence: “It is very clear. The Germans can’t sell their cars. So they will make tanks.”
Trump’s final favour to Europe is to hasten the post-Brexit rapprochement between the EU and the UK. Sir Keir Starmer and Emmanuel Macron, the British and French leaders, have worked together closely on Ukraine. They could form a powerful triumvirate with Merz.
One mechanism for increasing military spending would be a new European defence fund, in which Britain could participate. This would have the added virtue of giving the UK and the EU a new form of co-operation that avoids reopening the Pandora’s box of Brexit.
The prospect of repairing some of the damage done by Brexit underlines that this is not just a moment of threat for Europe. It is also a moment of opportunity. Europe can now plausibly offer a more stable business environment than Trump’s America — which may already be reflected in the relative performance of stock markets in the US and Europe.
As the Trump administration increases its assault on US universities, there is also a chance to attract leading researchers to Europe. The gap in salaries and research money between North America and Europe is large. But the overall sums of money involved are small, when compared with the amounts being thrown around for defence.
There will be plenty of disagreements and setbacks on the way to greater European unity. France and Germany are already clashing over how the new EU defence fund will spend its money.
Every clash like that will feed the scepticism of those who say that Europe will never get its act together. There were similar doubts and setbacks on the often bumpy road to setting up the original European coal and steel community in the 1950s and the single currency in the 1990s. But European leaders got there in the end because the political imperative to agree was so overwhelming.
All of the great leaps forward for European unity have been caused by geopolitical shocks — first the end of the second world war; then the end of the cold war. Now, courtesy of Trump, we are looking at the end of the transatlantic alliance. Europe responded with strength and inventiveness to the last two great challenges. It can do so again.
gideon.rachman@ft.com
