One issue that the FT contributions of Martin Sandbu (“Can Europe go it alone on Russia sanctions?”, Free Lunch, FT.com, February 27) and Elina Ribakova (“There’s no money to be made in Russia”, Opinion, March 12) leave unaddressed is what the conditions are under which economic sanctions work.

Economic sanctions are more likely to succeed, as American political scientist and authority on the topic Robert A Pape has demonstrated, in conflicts not involving territorial disputes. Yet, the European sanctions package of 2014 targeted Russian officials responsible for menacing Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

The effectiveness of sanctions also depends on whether the target state changes its foreign policy because of those sanctions, which was not the case with Russia over the past 10 years.

Sanctions must moreover align with the political influence of the state or states imposing sanctions. For example the EU excluded Russian banks in 2022 from Swift, the world’s leading financial messaging system, but Russia circumvented this via third parties like the UAE.

Europeans now contemplate seizing billions of frozen Russian foreign exchange reserves. But even without these assets, Russia has been able to prosecute its war, and with China and North Korea it now enjoys alternative sources of support.

A more thoughtful approach to sanctions would detail the expected economic and military damage, as well as regime and foreign policy changes. It would specify what effects sanctions are not expected to generate. It would ensure that economic sanctions reinforce the EU’s and UK’s military initiatives to deter Russia, closing loopholes for third parties to circumvent those sanctions. This includes clauses in EU and UK trade agreements with third parties, specifying which sensitive goods the third party cannot sell elsewhere without EU or UK approval. This is more likely to diminish Russia’s conviction that it can win the territorial conflict, or at least will convince Russia that it can win only at prohibitive cost.

Ten years after the first sanctions package, the EU and the UK have widened their approach with massive defence spending plans unveiled amid a stated willingness to send thousands of troops to police any ceasefire.

Despite these initiatives, there is no guarantee this will tilt the balance of the conflict in Europe’s favour. Equally, if the sanctions are ill-considered, they will not help Europe’s cause either.

Michiel Foulon
Guest Professor in International Relations,
University of Antwerp, Belgium



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