Is the US still an ally? Has it even become an adversary? That Europeans are asking themselves these questions shows how radically Donald Trump and his new administration have rewritten the terms of the transatlantic security relationship. Trump has refused to rule out the use of force to take control of Greenland, the sovereign territory of Nato ally Denmark. In its haste to reach a deal with Russia to end its war against Ukraine, Trump’s team has made early concessions to Moscow while cutting Kyiv and European capitals out of the talks. US officials claim to want a fair and sustainable peace in Ukraine but, at the same time, are preying on the country’s mineral wealth as back payment for previous US military aid.
It was always clear, the US would force Europeans to take on more of the burden of their own security. The question was whether the shift would be agreed and orderly or whether it would be chaotic and dangerous. Europe missed the moment to prepare for the former and is now faced with the latter.
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine three years ago, Europeans have collectively failed to rearm with the speed and scale that Russia’s unprovoked aggression demanded, notwithstanding the efforts of Poland and other frontline states and some defence innovations by the EU. Trump’s return to power and the antagonism of his administration have shattered Europe’s complacency.
An emergency meeting of European leaders in Paris on Monday was an initial chance to show renewed resolve and ambition to rebuild the continent’s defences and ensure that any Ukraine peace deal is just and durable. But it was dispiritingly inconclusive. Britain’s Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer boldly said he was ready to send troops to Ukraine to guarantee peace post-ceasefire if the US provided back-up. Other leaders found the question too difficult. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz churlishly said he was “irritated” the issue had come up at all.
Europe should still act in its long-term interests, even if it would struggle to defend itself today without American support. Its future security will be decided in Ukraine so its first duty is to step up military aid to Kyiv by funding Ukrainian weapons production, pouring resources into drone and anti-drone technology, subsidising expanded production capacity and signing long-term contracts to replace US-supplied kit such as air defences and long-range strikes. It could use its sanctions regime to access and influence negotiations.
European powers need to draw up military plans to deter Russia from attacking Ukraine again after a ceasefire, ranging from better training of Ukrainian troops to enforcing a no-fly zone to potentially sending troops as a “reassurance force”. Putting boots on the ground in sufficient quantity would be a huge endeavour. It may prove impossible without US support. But Europeans cannot deter Russia by standing aside.
Lastly, Europeans have to invest. Beefing up defences primarily requires sustained increases in national defence spending, with countries revising their fiscal frameworks and expenditure priorities to make room. There is a strong case for joint borrowing, either at EU level or as a coalition of the willing including the UK, to fund a short-term spending boost and to finance joint procurement. A multilateral defence bank could also help governments and defence manufacturers. Europe will also need to build up standalone planning and command structures, ideally within Nato but potentially outside it.
It is not impossible that these steps could persuade Trump to stick with a rebalanced alliance and maintain an ultimate US security guarantee for Europe. What is certain is that without such an overhaul, Europe will be dangerously exposed.
