President Donald Trump’s transformation of the US into a deeply unreliable partner has prompted a radical reconsideration of defence policy among Nato members. The implications for Washington’s allies in the Asia-Pacific have drawn much less attention, but are every bit as profound. The rise of an authoritarian and assertive China that is far more powerful than Russia poses a far-reaching challenge to democracies in the region that have long relied on US might to keep them safe.
That challenge is particularly acute for Japan and South Korea. Alliance with the US has been the central pillar of their security since the 1950s. Around 60,000 US military personnel are stationed in Japan; nearly 30,000 US troops are based in South Korea.
On the surface, their ties with the US are robust. After a cordial meeting with Trump at the White House last month, Japan’s Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba even talked of a “new golden age” in bilateral relations. China hawks in Trump’s administration hope he will value Asian allies as Washington shifts its focus towards the Pacific. Some in Tokyo were reassured by Trump and Ishiba’s joint warning against any Chinese attempt to use “force or coercion” to change the status quo in the East China Sea and their stress on the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Yet there is good reason to doubt Trump’s commitment to Taiwan. The president shows no sign of being willing to expend US blood or treasure for an island he accuses of “stealing” the US semiconductor industry. But a Chinese takeover of Taiwan would end the Pax Americana in Asia and allow Beijing to dominate shipping lanes vital to the economies of Japan and South Korea.
So what should they do? Some in both countries will welcome a distancing from the US hegemon. But for these proudly distinct and democratic nations, avoiding falling under the sway of an assertive China will require spending more on defence. Doing so should also soften US complaints about freeloading. Japan has dramatically increased its defence budget, but it is still targeted to reach just 2 per cent of GDP by 2027. Despite being menaced by a nuclear-armed North, South Korea spends only around 2.8 per cent.
To get more bang for their buck — and reduce dependence on the US — both should work more closely with democracies across the region and beyond. Japan’s agreement with the UK and Italy to jointly develop a new fighter is a good step. New alliances among the region’s natural allies would also help. Ishiba has talked of creating of an “Asian Nato”. But the priority should be tightening ties between Tokyo and Seoul, prickly neighbours that past US presidents have had to cajole to work together on security issues.
Declining faith in the US nuclear umbrella will inevitably prompt some allies to consider deterrent forces of their own, an option being widely discussed in South Korea. Japan, haunted by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is more reticent. Proceeding would deal a heavy blow to efforts to limit global nuclear proliferation.
It is not yet clear if politicians in Tokyo and Seoul are prepared to grapple with such weighty issues. Forging even the most rudimentary bilateral alliance will be complicated by Korean resentment of Japan’s past colonial rule and Tokyo’s pacifist constitution. President Yoon Suk Yeol’s failed attempt to impose martial law has thrown Seoul’s recent rapprochement with Tokyo into doubt. Ishiba’s influence is limited by the loss of his Liberal Democratic party’s parliamentary majority last year. Neither country looks ready to rethink their entire security strategy. But that is exactly what they must begin to do.
